Nasty Gal
A $100 million fashion brand, a rejected $400 million offer, bankruptcy, and two sales for a fraction of its peak.
Sophia Amoruso built Nasty Gal from an eBay store into a fashion retailer with more than $100 million in annual revenue. She later said she rejected a $400 million acquisition offer. In November 2016, the company filed for bankruptcy, and Boohoo bought its intellectual property for $20 million.
The story did not end there. On September 15, 2026, Debenhams Group, formerly Boohoo Group, sold Nasty Gal again for $16 million. The brand had survived for a decade without its founder, but its annual gross merchandise value had fallen to £12 million.
At a glance:
| Founded | 2006 |
| Founder | Sophia Amoruso |
| Started as | Nasty Gal Vintage on eBay |
| Peak annual revenue | More than $100M |
| Revenue before bankruptcy | $85M in 2014; $77M in 2015 |
| Outside capital | $65M through early 2015, plus $24M in later equity and debt |
| Bankruptcy | Chapter 11, November 2016 |
| 2017 sale | $20M to Boohoo |
| 2026 sale | $16M to WSG Brands |
| Current owner | WSG Brands |
The Story
The $8 Chanel jacket
Amoruso was 22 and working at the security desk of an art school when she opened Nasty Gal Vintage on eBay in 2006. She searched thrift stores for clothes, styled them on friends, shot the photographs, and wrote every listing herself.
One early find was a Chanel jacket that cost $8 and sold for more than $1,000. Amoruso styled it on a model, photographed it like a fashion editorial, and wrote the listing around the look. The presentation helped make Nasty Gal recognizable before the company produced clothes of its own.
She also built a following on MySpace by finding women who followed magazines and brands with a similar aesthetic. Around 60,000 people followed Nasty Gal there. New listings went out through bulletins and blog posts, bringing the same buyers back without a paid advertising budget.
60,000 followers left eBay with her
eBay suspended Nasty Gal in 2008 after Amoruso put the address for her coming website in customer feedback. Other sellers had also accused her of bidding on her own auctions, an allegation she denied.
The suspension removed her storefront, but it did not remove the audience she had built. Those women followed Nasty Gal to its own website, where Amoruso controlled the photography, prices, checkout, and customer relationship.
Revenue reached $10 million in 2010 and $28 million in 2011. Nasty Gal had no outside financing, no stores, and almost no conventional advertising. By the time venture capital firms became interested, the company had already proved that its customers would follow it away from a marketplace and buy directly.
$49 million in five months
Index Ventures invested $9 million in March 2012 and another $40 million that August. Nasty Gal had been bootstrapped through its first six years, but the new capital gave it the money to hire, carry more inventory, and build the infrastructure for a much larger retailer.
The company moved into a 50,300-square-foot Los Angeles headquarters, built a fulfillment center in Kentucky, developed an original clothing line, and opened stores on Melrose Avenue and in Santa Monica. Headcount approached 300. Annual revenue passed $100 million.
Amoruso’s public profile grew with the company. Her 2014 memoir, #GIRLBOSS, became a New York Times bestseller and supplied the name for a wider conversation about young female founders. Nasty Gal brought customers to the book, while the book introduced more people to Nasty Gal.
Revenue fell as costs rose
Revenue dropped to $85 million in fiscal 2014 and $77 million in 2015. The company had built its headquarters, fulfillment operation, stores, staff, and inventory commitments for continued growth, so the decline created a cash problem as well as a sales problem.
Nasty Gal was also struggling to keep customers. Its original shoppers were getting older, and the company spent heavily to replace women who did not return. Moving further into original products increased the consequences of a weak assortment because Nasty Gal had to forecast demand, commit to production, and hold unsold inventory.
Amoruso stepped down as CEO in January 2015, and Sheree Waterson took the role. Amoruso had said that she did not enjoy having eight executives reporting to her and repeatedly asking whether the company was meeting its targets. Weeks after the change, Ron Johnson led a $16 million investment that brought Nasty Gal’s publicly reported equity funding to $65 million.
The company raised another $24 million in equity and debt during 2015 and 2016. Sales continued to fall, vendors went unpaid, and Nasty Gal struggled with high occupancy costs and debt covenant violations. It filed for Chapter 11 protection on November 9, 2016. Amoruso resigned as executive chair and lost her board seat and ownership.
$20 million, then $16 million
Boohoo bought Nasty Gal’s intellectual property and customer database for $20 million in February 2017. The original company, stores, and team were not part of the future business. Boohoo kept the name and relaunched Nasty Gal on its own platform.
Nine years later, Boohoo’s renamed parent company, Debenhams Group, sold the brand to WSG Brands for $16 million in cash. Nasty Gal had generated £12 million in gross merchandise value and £400,000 in adjusted EBITDA during the year ending February 2026. Debenhams described the business as non-core and not material to the group.
WSG Brands now owns Nasty Gal’s global intellectual property. Its plans include wholesale distribution, collaborations, and brand licensing.
The Strategy
Editorial product photography
Most eBay clothing listings in 2006 documented an item. Amoruso styled a complete look and photographed it on a model who represented the customer she wanted. The result looked closer to a fashion editorial than a secondhand listing.
That presentation helped an unknown seller build a recognizable identity before Nasty Gal had its own products. Customers returned for Amoruso’s selection and styling, not only for a particular vintage label.
An audience independent of eBay
Nasty Gal’s MySpace following gave Amoruso a way to contact customers outside eBay. When the marketplace suspended her account, she could tell 60,000 followers where the store had moved.
The same risk applies to businesses built on Instagram, TikTok, Etsy, or Amazon. A direct customer list and an independent website reduce the amount of control any one platform has over the company.
Original products
Nasty Gal introduced its own label in 2012, and the line grew to roughly 35 percent of sales. Original products offered stronger gross margins than third-party clothing and could not be price-compared with another retailer’s identical stock.
They also changed the financial risk. Nasty Gal had to choose sizes and quantities months before a sale, pay factories, and absorb the cost of products customers did not want. A missed collection tied up cash that the vintage model had never required at the same scale.
Expansion before retention
The large headquarters, Kentucky fulfillment center, stores, and growing team added fixed costs just as repeat purchasing weakened. Revenue was falling, but rent, payroll, debt payments, and inventory commitments remained.
By the bankruptcy, Nasty Gal did not have enough liquidity to buy a healthy flow of new inventory or cover normal operating costs. Fewer new products gave existing customers less reason to return, which put more pressure on acquisition spending and cash flow.
The Marketing
Manual audience targeting
Amoruso found potential customers by looking through the followers of Nylon and similar fashion accounts on MySpace. She added women whose taste matched the store, then used each new auction as a reason to contact them again.
It was slow, deliberate audience building. Nasty Gal reached $28 million in revenue before social platforms offered modern advertising tools and before the company accepted outside funding.
The founder as a media channel
#GIRLBOSS extended Amoruso’s reach beyond fashion customers. The book became a bestseller, led to conferences and a media company, and was adapted into a 13-episode Netflix series in 2017.
Her profile kept growing while Nasty Gal cut staff, changed executives, and lost revenue. The attention supported awareness, but it could not improve the product mix, customer retention, or operating costs.
The Numbers
| Year | Revenue or GMV | What changed |
|---|---|---|
| 2010 | $10M revenue | Still bootstrapped |
| 2011 | $28M revenue | No outside financing or paid marketing |
| 2012 | $100M+ revenue | Raised $49M from Index Ventures |
| 2014 | $85M revenue | First store opened; layoffs began |
| 2015 | $77M revenue | CEO change and another $16M investment |
| FY2026 | £12M GMV | £400K adjusted EBITDA under Debenhams |
The 2014 and 2015 figures came from bankruptcy records. They are more reliable than the higher estimates published while Nasty Gal was still private. Together, they show that a retailer can report tens of millions in revenue while losing customers and running short of the cash needed for inventory.
Funding: Nasty Gal raised $65 million in equity from 2012 through early 2015, followed by $24 million in equity and debt during its final two years. The company could not secure the additional capital it needed to avoid bankruptcy.
Rejected offer: Amoruso said in a 2025 interview that she turned down a $400 million acquisition offer. The offer was not disclosed publicly at the time, so the figure comes from her later account. The company eventually sold from bankruptcy for 5 percent of that amount.
Value after bankruptcy: Boohoo paid $20 million in 2017, and WSG Brands paid $16 million in 2026. Both buyers acquired the Nasty Gal name and intellectual property rather than the original operating company.
Controversies
Pregnancy discrimination lawsuits
Former employees filed lawsuits in 2015 alleging that Nasty Gal had fired four workers who were pregnant or preparing to take parental leave. One complaint claimed that the company placed affected employees into wider layoffs to hide the reason for their termination.
Nasty Gal called the claims frivolous and without merit. The lawsuits were filed one year after Amoruso published #GIRLBOSS, a book centered on women taking control of their careers.
Layoffs and management turnover
Nasty Gal cut roughly 10 percent of its staff in 2014 and made further cuts in 2016. Senior executives also left as Amoruso moved from CEO to executive chair and then resigned during bankruptcy.
The company was making several operational changes at once. It was expanding from vintage resale into manufacturing, physical stores, and international fulfillment while revenue and customer retention were declining.
What You Can Learn
Build an audience you can move. Nasty Gal survived its eBay suspension because 60,000 women followed Amoruso elsewhere. An email list and an independent website provide the same protection today.
Know what outside capital changes. Nasty Gal reached $28 million without investors. After raising $65 million, it hired aggressively and took on the costs of space, stores, inventory, and fulfillment built for much higher sales.
Revenue is not the same as available cash. Nasty Gal generated tens of millions of dollars while struggling to pay vendors and buy inventory. Working capital can put a growing product business in danger before demand disappears.
Founder attention cannot replace operations. Amoruso’s book and media work made her more famous while Nasty Gal’s retention and product problems worsened. Awareness can bring in a first order, but the assortment and customer experience determine whether there is a second.
A brand can retain value after the company fails. Nasty Gal entered bankruptcy in 2016, yet its name and intellectual property have since sold for a combined $36 million.
The closest next read is The Rise and Fall of the Girlboss, which follows the idea Nasty Gal helped create after the company stopped belonging to its founder.
Frequently Asked Questions
What happened to Nasty Gal?
Nasty Gal filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in November 2016 after revenue declined, costs remained high, and the company could not raise enough new capital. Boohoo bought its intellectual property for $20 million in 2017 and continued operating the brand.
Who owns Nasty Gal now?
WSG Brands owns Nasty Gal. It bought the brand and its global intellectual property rights from Debenhams Group for $16 million on September 15, 2026.
Does Sophia Amoruso still own Nasty Gal?
No. Amoruso lost her ownership when the original company went through bankruptcy. She has not controlled the brand since 2016.
Why did Nasty Gal fail?
Revenue fell from $85 million in 2014 to $77 million in 2015 while Nasty Gal carried the costs of a large headquarters, fulfillment infrastructure, stores, staff, and inventory. Bankruptcy records also cited liquidity problems, high occupancy costs, and debt covenant issues.
How much did Nasty Gal sell for?
Boohoo bought Nasty Gal out of bankruptcy for $20 million in 2017. Debenhams Group, formerly Boohoo Group, sold it to WSG Brands for $16 million in 2026.
Did Sophia Amoruso turn down $400 million?
Amoruso said in a 2025 founder interview that she rejected a $400 million acquisition offer for Nasty Gal. The amount was not disclosed publicly when the offer was made, so it relies on her later account.
Is Girlboss based on Nasty Gal?
Yes. Amoruso’s 2014 memoir #GIRLBOSS tells the story of building Nasty Gal. Netflix adapted it into a fictionalized 13-episode series that premiered in 2017.
Sources
- The New York Times, “Nasty Gal, an Online Start-Up, Is a Fast-Growing Retailer,” March 25, 2013. The $8 Chanel jacket, MySpace audience, early growth, and founding story.
- Forbes, “Why Nasty Gal Landed Venture Capital Funding,” June 28, 2012. Revenue growth from $10 million to $28 million without outside financing.
- Forbes, “Fashion Phenom Nasty Gal Raises $40 Million,” August 26, 2012. Index Ventures’ $9 million and $40 million investments.
- TechCrunch, “Fashion Outpost Nasty Gal Raises $9M From Index Ventures, With $28M In Revenue,” March 5, 2012. Funding, revenue, and early operating data.
- Vox, “Nasty Gal Founder Hands Over CEO Role at Cutting-Edge Online Fashion Retailer,” January 12, 2015. CEO transition and Nasty Gal private-label share.
- Los Angeles Times, “Nasty Gal, Once a Fashion World Darling, Is Now Bankrupt. What Went Wrong?” February 24, 2017. Bankruptcy records, revenue decline, financing, customer retention, and operating problems.
- Forbes, “As Nasty Gal Files Bankruptcy, Founder Sophia Amoruso’s Fortune Decimated,” November 11, 2016. Total funding, bankruptcy, and Amoruso’s loss of ownership.
- Fashionista, “Lawsuit Claims Nasty Gal Fired 4 Employees for Getting Pregnant,” June 10, 2015. Pregnancy discrimination allegations and Nasty Gal’s response.
- Glossy, “Timeline: How Nasty Gal Arrived at Bankruptcy,” November 11, 2016. Layoffs, stores, private-label expansion, and bankruptcy timeline.
- The Split, “Sophia Amoruso: Building Nasty Gal, Turning Down $400M, and Losing It All,” 2025. Amoruso’s account of the rejected acquisition offer and the company’s peak.
- Investegate, “Disposal of Nasty Gal for $16m,” September 15, 2026. Sale price, buyer, FY2026 GMV, adjusted EBITDA, and transaction terms.
- Retail Dive, “Allbirds’ IP Owner Snaps Up Nasty Gal for $16M,” September 16, 2026. Independent confirmation of the 2026 sale and WSG’s expansion plans.
- PR Newswire, “WSG Brands Acquires Nasty Gal, Ushering in a New Era for the Iconic Fashion Brand,” September 15, 2026. WSG’s planned wholesale, licensing, collaboration, and international strategy.